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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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DEFINING THE NAVY'S FUTURE ROLE IN JOINT WARFARE

By

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 February 2005

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ABSTRACT

Policy documents, such as Joint Vision 2020 and Sea Power 21, have outlined the path to a truly joint environment. The role of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) is critical to the Navy's future in the joint maritime environment. However, the doctrine to support the construct for the JFMCC has been slow to develop while that of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) has been defined and matured. In order to move forward, the role and realm of the JFMCC requires definition and direction. This will minimize seams among the air, land and sea component commanders. This process cannot be done with doctrine alone. Commanders must understand the unique culture of the Naval Service to overcome biases that can prevent true jointness. Through joint doctrine and joint education and training the role of the JFMCC can be solidified. In doing so, the Joint Force Commander will increase the effectiveness of his forces as unity of command is achieved and the component forces become a true joint force.

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INTRODUCTION

“All the high tech weapons in the world will not transform the United States Armed Forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight.”


Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense
National Defense University, 31Jan02

Beginning with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Department of Defense has expanded and matured the concept of joint operations. The aim of which is to achieve synergy by leveraging the unique abilities of each of the Services; thus, forming a single, coherent fighting force. By doing so, the combined capabilities can be tied to the Principles of War¹ to achieve the aim of the military – “winning the nation’s wars.”² The concept of joint warfare is not new. From the Battle of Yorktown to Leyte Gulf, American military history has demonstrated the use of combined arms as a force multiplier. However, the creation of a joint doctrinal foundation for the Armed Forces is unique.

With a foundation in place, the joint operating concept has matured and developed during the past two decades. The overwhelming military successes of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and the major combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) have highlighted the relative advantage that United States military has in bringing significant joint combat power to a theater of operations. This is not to say that continued refinement of doctrinal concepts is not required.

An area that continues to need refinement is command and control. For the Navy, specifically, the development and maturation of doctrine for the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) is critical to defining the Navy’s future role in joint operations. As stated in joint doctrine, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) has the “authority

to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.”³ The JP 0-2 outlines two possible organizational structures based on service components and functional components. Figure 1 highlights the possible JTF structures⁴.



Recent military operations, encompassing the entire spectrum of military operations from full scale war in OIF to humanitarian operations in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, have exemplified shift to command structures that are predominantly based on the functional components. This ideal is further validated by the significant development of doctrine for the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC).

The foundation for the JFMCC, however, remains in its infancy. In order to maintain its relevance in the joint environment, it is critical to develop joint doctrine for the JFMCC. This must clearly delineate the roles and realm of the JFMCC. In doing so, the aim would be reduction in seams that develop between functional component commanders. As the opening quote indicates, this cannot be done by doctrine alone. While developing the construct of the JFMCC, it is critical that the Navy continue to pursue a transformation from a naval culture to that of a joint culture. To facilitate this change, fleet commanders must evaluate the composition of their staffs with regard to the JFMCC construct and promote Joint Education and training which builds on the doctrine and allows the staff to integrate seamlessly in the joint environment. In doing so, naval forces will continue the process of integrating the Services components into a single fighting force providing the JFC the capabilities necessary for full spectrum dominance. It is within this framework that this paper will examine the Navy's future with regard to the JFMCC.

THE NAVAL CULTURE

Within an organization as large as the United States Navy, change is often difficult. A main reason for that is the culture of the organization. While a complete discussion on the Service culture of the Navy is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to put into historical context culture biases of the Navy. In doing so, one may better understand why the Navy is arguably lagging behind the other services in developing doctrine and embracing joint warfare.⁵

The Navy as an organization is inherently independent. Going back to the days of sailing ships, the fleet would depart and conduct the nation's business with little direction

or control from higher command. This independence was fostered throughout time and continued to permeate naval culture into the 20th century. In fact, it has been said “[t]he department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the services – it has its own army, navy, and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone.”⁶

This cultural theme was re-enforced by the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan. His theories on sea power exemplified the independence and inherent expeditionary nature of the Navy. Mahan believed that insular powers, such as the United States, would deploy their navies as the first line of defense. The aim would be to engage and defeat the enemy in a decisive battle.⁷

However, the emergence of the United States as the sole world super power has challenged Mahan’s doctrine. Without a near competitor, the blue water fleet on fleet engagement may well be an ideal of the past. The constructs of Mahan’s theories remain sound, but the operational environment has changed. No longer will the Navy operate solely in blue water as an independent fighting force. The primary focus has shifted to the littoral environment. The battlespace has moved closer into shore as the naval role shifts from defeating large fleets to providing support for air/ground forces and providing sea control. This has not been without consternation.

During the Gulf War, Naval commanders wearily accepted the new concept of the JFACC. “Several . . . expressed reservations about the Navy’s involvement in an air campaign centrally directed [by an Air Force JFACC].”⁸ In fact, they initially opposed the concept altogether. Parochialism played a large role as the Navy distrusted the Air Force and their motives in designing the air campaign and the concept of the JFACC having

tactical control over Navy aircraft. The independent nature of the naval culture pushed against the joint concept as the Navy sought to maintain operational and tactical control over its assets.⁹

While the issues of the Gulf War air campaign were resolved, it highlights a reluctance of the Navy to accept a truly joint concept. The lack of published doctrine, as of February 2005, regarding the JFMCC demonstrates that progress towards “jointness” continues to be slow. This is not to say that it is not progressing, it simply demonstrates the cultural bias and its effect on transformation has slowed the Navy’s progress relative to other Services.

SEA POWER 21: THE NAVY’S ROADMAP

“Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders.”

ADM Vern Clark
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)

Opponents to the argument that the Navy is lagging behind other Services may argue that the naval service has made great strides in becoming a truly “joint” and the true measures of effectiveness to adequately judge the degree of transformation are unavailable. While this cannot be dismissed, the lack of published doctrine for the maritime functional component commander does lend itself to the argument that Navy doctrine is lagging behind the other Services. These issues aside, in order to move forward, it is critical to have a vision. This vision will guide an organization to the desired end state.

With the Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 sets the course for transformation with “[t]he overarching focus of this vision is full spectrum dominance.”¹⁰

The Navy has further refined Joint Vision 2020 and developed a roadmap in Sea Power 21, the aim of which “is global in scope, fully joint in execution, and dedicated to transformation.”¹¹ In publishing this document, the CNO outlined his path for the future. It is a path to create jointness. Some may argue that the Navy is already a joint force. The reality is, while progress is being made, the Navy has not transformed into a truly joint force. Continued diligence is required achieve the military detailed in Joint Vision 2020.

The tenets of Sea Power 21 are Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. As stated in Sea Power 21:

“Sea Strike is the ability to project precise and persistent offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends defensive assurance throughout the world; and Sea Basing enhances operational independence and support for the joint force.....Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing will be enabled by Forcenet, an overarching effort to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a fully netted, combat force.”¹²

Beyond understanding the tenets of Sea Power 21, it is critical to understand the links from naval vision to the joint vision; one of which is the JFMCC.

In essence, the role of the JFMCC is that of an enabler. It allows a single functional component commander to exercise command and control over all forces within the maritime domain while synchronizing efforts with the other functional component commanders. The resultant unity of command allows the maritime component commander to bring to bear the operational capabilities of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. The JFMCC, therefore, is critical to focusing naval power to meet the operational requirements and goals outlined by the JFC. In this context, the development and maturity of the JFMCC is critical to meeting the visions outlined in Sea Power 21 and Joint Vision 2020, thus sustaining future operational relevance in the joint environment.

DEFINING THE REALM OF THE JFMCC

“A military, naval, littoral war when wisely prepared and discretely conducted is a terrible sort of war. Happy for the people who are sovereign of the sea to put into execution. For it comes like thunder and lightning to some unprepared part of the world”

Thomas Molyneux, 1759

At the present time, there is no published doctrine to encapsulate the role and battlespace of the JFMCC. Naval doctrine focuses on application and use of naval assets to include command and control. However, these publications fall short of providing the JFMCC the tools necessary to plan, organize, and operate in a joint environment. In fact, the concept of the JFMCC has been used for multiple operations and contingencies with no doctrinal guidance. The individual commander has been left to piece naval and joint doctrine to develop concepts that can be applied operationally. It is critical to push the development of joint doctrine to ensure that the JFC have functional component commanders that conform to standard procedures. This not only benefits the JFC, but increases efficiencies horizontally with other functional component commanders.

Joint doctrine is in the works with the JP-3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations - currently in its second draft. This publication coupled with the Naval Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 3-32-03 titled Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution will set the doctrinal foundation. These publications provide two key critical points: 1) defining the battlespace of the JFMCC, and 2) defining the role of the JFMCC within that space.

Currently, the draft JP 3-32 states that “[m]aritime operations are conducted in the maritime environment, which includes the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas and the airspace above these, including the littorals as defined in Joint Publication

(JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”¹³ The term littoral has currently not been added to the JP 1-02; however, the term is defined in draft publication and additionally in JP 3-0 as an area that “comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.”¹⁴

This definition is worth a bit of discussion. The second part defines littoral based landward as an area that “can be supported and defended directly from the sea.” It does not simply end at the coastline. This expands the maritime environment potentially well ashore. The concept of Sea Basing promotes joint forces utilizing the freedom of maneuver from the sea to project power ashore. Could the battlespace of the JFMCC then project well ashore and could those forces be supported from the sea? The answer is yes.

If one supports Huntington’s view that near term conflicts will be in the “gap” countries, it could be said that the naval role in future conflicts will be significant.¹⁵ Additionally, nearly 70 percent of the world’s populations live within 200 miles of the sea.¹⁶ Looking at the current capabilities of Marine air and ground assets, the assumption could be made that the area of operations (AO)¹⁷ of the JFMCC could potentially extend well inland and into what under currently many would define as the battlespace of the JFLCC.

This potential seam could limit unity of command between functional components. While it is unlikely that the JFMCC would actually control a “maritime” area that included several hundred miles inland, the battlespace of the JFMCC could overlap significantly with other commanders. An example of this occurred during OIF. Naval forces were

tasked with conducting mine clearance operations in the inland waterways of Iraq to the port of Umm Qasr. While a JFMCC task, it was conducted in the battlespace dominated by the JFLCC. While the scope of the operation was limited, it does demonstrate the potential ability of the JFMCC to project naval power well inland.¹⁸

The argument could be made that this ideal of JFMCC “owning” area up to 200 miles inland is unrealistic. I do not argue this point. The actual incursion into that vast amount of JFLCC battlespace in support of a JFC most likely would not occur in that manner. However, it may be argued that the current proposed definition is vague enough to allow for interpretation, and that as the Navy pushes into brown water, the battlespace is compressed and seams between component commanders will increase. This is a potential problem that the JFC will need to address in defining the area of operations for his commanders to ensure unity of command.

Beyond the doctrinal battlespace, it is necessary to analyze what role the JFMCC plays in the JTF structure. The draft JP 3-32 states that the JFMCC is the maritime warfighter and that “[w]hen designated, a JFMCC is the single maritime voice regarding maritime forces and requirements and makes recommendations to the JFC regarding prioritization and allocation of joint maritime force assets.”¹⁹

In and of itself, this definition seems to highlight several advantages to the functional component structure and succinctly defines the role of the maritime commander. It is simple, promotes unity of command, and synchronized and integrated JFMCC force planning and execution.²⁰ That is until one analyzes the proposed definition of maritime forces. The maritime force is defined by the JP 3-32 draft as “[f]orces that operate on,

under, or above the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, sea control, or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea.”²¹

This definition seemingly limits the role of the JFMCC to commanding naval forces. In that case, the JFC may not require establishing a JFMCC. A functional component is normally established when the “scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command are primary considerations.”²² If the JFMCC only commanded Navy and Marine forces, there would be no requirement for a maritime component commander. The forces could simply fall under the Service Component commander and the naval command and control structure. The essential element is the command of forces of two or more services to achieve the maritime mission.

The question for the JFC would be: why establish a JFMCC? Under this context, the answer could be that you don’t always have to. Warfare is not black and white. There are no lines to differentiate tasks to a single functional component commander. Whether assigned or not, operations in the maritime environment requires coordination and forces from all services.

The context of the argument demonstrates that the doctrine needs further refinement. It is not to say that it is incorrect. It shows the potential for interpretation that can magnify the seams between functional component commanders. Additionally, Joint Force staffs must understand that they will need to clarify the realm and the role of the JFMCC. Lastly, it demonstrates that the concept of the JFMCC is based on naval culture. While the JFMCC will normally be from the Service that has a preponderance of forces, it must be understood that naval commanders must ensure that their plans for the maritime

domain go beyond the naval concept and integrate Army, Air Forces and multi-national forces as required to achieve battlespace dominance.

NAVAL STAFF OR JOINT STAFF?

In developing a viable maritime component, the effects of naval culture and developing doctrine have been examined. Those concepts provide the prospective JFC or JFMCC the intangibles that can and do play a role in their effectiveness in the maritime domain. The tangible portion is their staff itself. In outlining the organizational structure, the TACMEMO delineates that “JFMCC will normally be a numbered fleet commander or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander.”²³ The ability of the MEF commander to act as JFMCC is beyond the scope this paper and will not be discussed. However, the effectiveness and fleet staffs will be examined. In discussing the composition of naval staffs, the scope of analysis will be limited to a single staff’s ability to perform multiple roles in a joint environment.

The fleet staff performing multiple functions is not unique. The Commander Seventh Fleet website outlines that “Commander 7th Fleet (C7F) performs three jobs. First, C7F can be assigned as a Joint Task Force commander in the event of natural disaster or joint military operation. Second, C7F is the operational commander for all naval forces in the region; this is the job we do every day. Finally, C7F is designated as the Combined Naval Component Commander for the defense of the Korean peninsula; in the event of hostilities, all friendly naval forces in the theater would fall under C7F control.”²⁴

A key point worth discussing is what if Seventh Fleet is assigned the JTF commander, who would assume the role of the JFMCC? Would it fall to a subset of the

Seventh Fleet staff or a subordinate staff? The simple answer is – it depends. The commander sets up a command and control structure that he feels will best work to accomplish the mission. While the TACMEMO outlines that a fleet commander will normally be a JFMCC, this assumes an operation that is large enough to justify this. This may not be the case, and the Seventh Fleet example extenuates this fact. While used for illustrative purposes, a MOOTW may utilize a fleet commander in the role of the JTF commander. In this case, assuming a limited scope of operations, a Carrier Strike Group commander may be utilized in the role of JFMCC.

While the fleet staff undergoes training for their joint role, what capabilities would a subordinate commander have in the joint world? Have the staffs trained to the role of the JFMCC? Are they manned with personnel who are experienced in the joint environment? These questions are not meant to argue that they could not perform in the role; they are to highlight the potential problems for the JFC in standing up the JFMCC under the scope of the current doctrine. This is an issue that, if not addressed, could affect the C2 structure vertically and horizontally and reduce the overall unity of command.

While this author raises the question of the overall training level and its effects on the effectiveness of some naval staffs to fully integrate into the joint environment, others may question the validity of this line of thought. In essence, the counter argument could be that this is nothing that hasn't been done before. Commanders and staffs will react to the situation adapt and ultimately succeed in assigned mission. Throughout history, naval commanders have operated with joint forces and achieved amazing results with minimal training and integration. In a U.S. Army War College strategy research project, the author Robin Keister, details the Leyte Gulf and Okinawa campaigns [sic] as historical examples

where the primary tenants of the JFMCC concept could be applied and, in essence, could be validated using actual conflict. In the text, the author points out the limitations of the C2 structures utilized and then apply the JFMCC concept to attempt to validate the constructs.

Figure 2 outlines the actual C2 structure for U.S. Naval Forces during Leyte.





Figure 3 applies the concepts of the functional component commander to the Leyte command structure. While they are not a perfect fit, the author outlines that the case that a single leader in charge of naval forces may have alleviated C2 issues that were problematic between MacArthur and Halsey. In fact, the case is made that a JFMCC would have problems across C2 seams. “Poor coordination, poor command and control, poor synchronization, and poor communication might have led to disaster if not for the determined efforts of U.S. forces, confusion among and poor decisions by the Japanese commanders, and some luck of the draw. The absence of JFMCC, or at least, a commander

with overall control of all naval forces was a major factor, as later admitted by ADM Halsey.”²⁵



According to the author, the Leyte Campaign [sic] would seem to validate the role of the JFMCC. This operation demonstrated that even with limited training in joint environment and flawed C2 structures, the staffs did ultimately achieve the operational objective. As previously stated, I don't argue this fact. Leyte points out flaws in the structure and that they can be overcome and additionally validates the ideals of the JFMCC.

The question is not whether current navy staff structure can perform the role of JFMCC. The question is whether we are properly training, exercising, and manning these staffs to operate in the joint environment. As the current Secretary of Defense stated, we must “transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight.” With limited staff experience, this author does not pretend to be an expert.

However, as an outsider looking in, the impression is that Navy staffs tend not to be fluent in Operational Art and the joint planning process.

MOVING FORWARD

The question is then what changes need to be addressed to create a viable JFMCC. Some ideals are tangible, such as addressing current shortfalls in doctrine and training, while others are intangible such as moving the naval culture becoming more joint. The question must now shift to what the operational commander can do to affect this change to ensure their functional component commanders can seamlessly operate in a battlespace to achieve the operational goals. While the total answer is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is critical to address issues raised within the scope of the discussion. The two main catalysts for change are joint doctrine and joint education and training.

JOINT DOCTRINE

While the JFMCC has been used successfully in multiple operations, it is critical to publish doctrine in order to standardize command and control. This will not only facilitate unity of command, specifically between the JFMCC and JFC, but will also ensure commonality between functional component commanders. The maturation process must evolve the draft doctrine from a navy centric focus to that of a joint focus. By capturing and clarifying the entire maritime battlespace, the JFMCC can train to utilize and implement all the forces available vice those that are historically naval in nature. The doctrine should be incorporated into fleet level exercises to test the validity, train the appropriate staffs, and identify areas of concern. An example of this process was the JFMCC war game conducted at the Naval War College on 12-21 November 2003. The insights from this war game identified the following issues:

1. There is a training shortfall concerning the planning process. Participants did not understand what specific input and output was expected during each step of the planning process.
2. Information management needs to be addressed in the TACMEMO. Participants were unable to effectively handle the information flow.
3. Key concepts such as the Maritime Task Plan and the Maritime Mission Order, designed to help integrate planning, need to be revised to improve the process.
4. More clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the JFMCC staff should be addressed in the next revision of the TACMEMO.²⁶

This war game clearly defined key points that were observed that could be used to refine doctrine and ultimately the training of staff on the doctrine.

JOINT EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Doctrine alone will not adequately prepare commanders to perform the role of the JFMCC. Doctrine is essentially the base. It is imperative to build upon the base to create an organization that is trained and ready to immediately fulfill the role of the JFMCC.

During a 1994 symposium on “Standing Up a Joint Task Force”, it was observed that “through joint training and education that a viable joint culture will be developed.”²⁷ So, how is this accomplished? This can be done through several initiatives:

- 1) Require staffs from the CSG level to the Fleet level to have a percentage of its staff complete, at a minimum, JPME Phase I. In doing so, this would provide each staff a core group which would have knowledge in the concepts of Operational Art and Joint Warfare. This could facilitate transitions from naval to joint staffs to support contingencies and would further aid the integration horizontally in the JTF structure as key players from the different components would have a more common baseline.
- 2) Require staffs at the Fleet level and above to have a percentage of its staff complete JPME Phase II. These staffs continue to work in the joint

environment. It is critical to man them with personnel knowledgeable on joint warfare and doctrine. As in the Seventh Fleet example, if the staff is a standing JTF, education requirements for a portion of the staff should be comparable to a joint coded billet.

- 3) Modify the educational programs at the Naval War College. Specifically, develop a curriculum for the College of Naval Warfare that does not mirror that of the College of Command and Staff. Each curriculum should be appropriate to rank of the student. As such, the junior class should focus on JPME phase I while the senior class should be focused and modified to reflect JPME phase II.
- 4) Review the current bonus system to reflect an increased emphasis on jointness. The bonus system should enforce joint concept and not promote “sailing away from jointness”²⁸ An example is career sea pay. This pay is for troops serving aboard ship. A staff that embarks a ship is authorized sea pay. Naval personnel who were to go to a deployed joint staff ashore would not be authorized this pay. The perception may be that there are higher incentives to stay within the realm of navy billets vice joint. The Aviation Career Incentive Pay has a similar caveat. An O-5 can receive a bonus for taking orders to a ship or embarked Navy staff. That same officer could volunteer to serve on multi-national forces Iraq (for example) and would not be eligible for the bonus despite deploying. The impression could be that there is little incentive to go joint and, in fact, a monetary incentive to stay within the scope of Navy billets. The bonus system should be reflective of the Navy’s desire to develop and cultivate a joint culture not detract from it.

CONCLUSION

The functional component structure is a viable option for the JFC. To date, the naval forces have utilized the JFMCC structure with no doctrine. Much in the way Halsey overcame C2 issues during Leyte Gulf, the maritime commanders have worked around lack of guidance and structure. This, however, must not continue. To accentuate the advantages of the functional component structure, such as unity of command, it is critical to have a standard doctrine. This not only allows the JFC to understand the capabilities and limitations of the maritime component, but ensure standardization horizontally across the components. In joint warfare, the seams between components are ever increasing. The current areas of conflict only extenuate the overlaps and create areas that can be exploited by the enemy.

Doctrine alone will not solve the problem. The Navy must shift from a navy culture to a joint culture. Increasing the joint education for staff personnel will accelerate the change. Joint education should not be only for officers who are filling joint billets. It should be required for all officers. Essentially, it should be incorporated into the career path. This coupled with a realignment of the incentive programs can truly bring about the change and maturation of the joint culture.

Once again, the context of the opening quote becomes significant. In order to transform to meet the vision of Sea Power 21, the JFMCC needs to be matured and given significant emphasis to lead the naval forces into the future through education, training, and developing the joint mindset. By doing this, the Navy can continue to be a dominate force

in the joint environment and ultimately bring another component of military power to bear for the operational commander to truly encapsulate the vision of “one force”.

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (Washington, DC: 14 November 2000), Executive Summary, viii. JP-1 defines the key principles of war as: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity.

² Ibid, Executive Summary, v.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Publication 0-2 (Washington, DC: 10 July 2001, V-2.

⁴ Ibid, V-3. Figure based on Figure V-1 and taken from Operational Command and Control Presentation of the Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department.

⁵ Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1989), 30. In discussing service personalities and cultures, the author outlines the case that the Naval Service is resistant to the concept of jointness.

⁶ David C. Jones, "What's Wrong with Our Defense Establishment," New York Times Magazine, (November 1982): 73. Quoted by Builder, The Masks of War, pg 31.

⁷ Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1989), 74. Builder summarizes Mahan's theories in discussing the navy's development of strategy throughout the 20th century.

⁸ Brooks L. Bash, "Leadership and Parochialism: An Enduring Reality?" Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1999): 66.

⁹ Brooks L. Bash, "Leadership and Parochialism: An Enduring Reality?" Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1999): 66. Throughout this article, the author outlines the problems encountered due to service friction in the standing up of the JFACC concept. Specifically, detailing the distrust and reservations that the Navy had regarding the Air Force.

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020. (Washington, D.C.: June 2000), pg 3.

¹¹ ADM Vern Clark, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." Proceedings (October 2002): 41.

¹² ADM Vern Clark, "Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities." Proceedings (October 2002): 33-34.

¹³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations JP-32 2nd Draft (Washington, D.C.: 25 June 2003) pg I-1.

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations JP-32 2nd Draft (Washington, D.C.: 25 June 2003) pg GL-19.

¹⁵ Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). In his work, the author outlines the concepts of the gap countries. These are countries that have been left behind during the technological revolution. Due to various factors including geography and economies these countries are likely crises areas.

¹⁶ Carl Mundy, "Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994): 45.

¹⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations JP-32 2nd Draft (Washington, D.C.: 25 June 2003) pg GL-7. In maritime usage, the term is defined as operations conducted in a geographical area and not related to the protection of a specific force.

¹⁸ Based on personal experience. As OIC of H-60 detachment, conducted extensive operations inland Iraq approximately 60 nm. This missions were tasked by JFACC on the ATO supporting the JFMCC while operating in the battlespace of the JFLCC.

¹⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations JP-32 2nd Draft (Washington, D.C.: 25 June 2003) pg I-8.

²⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations JP-32 2nd Draft (Washington, D.C.: 25 June 2003) pg I-6. Graphic outlines key advantages and disadvantages to the JFC of the different command and control structures.

²¹ Ibid, pg 323.

²² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 2001) pg II 15-16.

²³ Naval Warfare Development Command, JFMCC Planning and Execution TACMEMO 3-32-03 (Newport, RI: June 2004): pg 3-1.

²⁴ “Forward Presence” Commander Seventh Fleet Information Page.
<<http://www.c7f.navy.mil/Pages/Forwardpresence.html>> [24 January 2005].

²⁵ Robin Keister, Designing the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Through Practical Applications Past Present and Future U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2002): pg 30.

²⁶ “JFMCC War Game Information Paper”
<<http://www.wargaming.quantico.usmc.mil/TitleX/USN/Documents/JFMCCinfopaper>> [10 January 2005]

²⁷ Susan J. Flores, “JTFs: Some Practical Implications” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1995): pg 113.

²⁸ Drew A. Bennett, “Special and Incentive Pay” Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 2002): pg 77-81. Author outlines differences in sea pay, sub pay, and other bonus that in his opinion push the forces away from jointness.

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